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Editors’Summary
THE BROOKINGS PANEL on Economic Activity held its sixty-seventh
conference in Washington, D.C., on March 25 and 26, 1999. This issue of
Brookings Papers includes the papers, reports, and discussions presented
at the conference. The ﬁrst paper undertakes an eclectic analysis of trends
and developments in the U.S. labor market, in search of clues to explain the
current propitious coincidence of low unemployment and falling inﬂation.
The second paper inquires whether, in the wake of recent currency crises
in developing economies, economists and policymakers should reconsider
their endorsement of capital account liberalization and concede, for some
countries, a useful role to official restrictions on capital inflows. The first
report examines a fundamental question raised by the recent crises, namely,
what contribution foreign capital inflows make to developing economies.
The second report provides some new perspectives on the supposedly
anemic U.S. saving rate by considering several conceptual adjustments to
ofﬁcial saving measures, including the effect of capital gains on household
wealth. The concluding report asks whether, after decades of concern about
inflation, a bout of deflation may now be in our future, and if so, whether
it poses special problems for stabilization policy.
IN THE FIRST QUARTER OF 1999 the U.S. unemployment rate was
down to 4.3 percent. This not only was the lowest rate in thirty years but
was nearly 2 percentage points below consensus estimates from only a few
years before of the NAIRU—the lowest unemployment rate consistent
with stable inﬂation. Indeed, the unemployment rate has been below 5 per-
cent since mid-1997, yet inﬂation, as measured by all broad price indices,
has actually declined in each of the past two years. In the first paper of this
issue, Lawrence Katz and Alan Krueger examine this remarkable perfor-
mance of the U.S. economy and attempt to identify factors that explain it
ixand to determine whether the improvement is likely to be permanent. They
begin by observing that favorable labor market developments are more
likely to represent lasting structural changes that could permanently lower
the sustainable unemployment rate, whereas developments outside the
labor market, such as the favorable price shocks identiﬁed by Robert Gor-
don (BPEA 2:1998), are more likely to be transitory. Guided by this
distinction, Katz and Krueger organize their analysis of labor market
developments around four hypotheses that could help explain a contem-
poraneous decline in both unemployment and wage pressures: favorable
demographic trends, the recent surge in the prison population, improved
efficiency in matching workers with jobs, and greater anxiety on work-
ers’part about job security.
Katz and Krueger start with an overview of unemployment, wage, and
price developments over recent decades. They note that last year’s 4.5
percent unemployment rate was below the low points for unemployment
achieved in each of the last three business cycles: 0.8 percentage point
below the 1989 rate, 1.3 percentage points below the 1979 rate, and 0.4
percentage point below the 1973 rate. However, unemployment in 1998
was still well above the 3.5 percent rate of 1969 when the Vietnam War
was in full swing and inﬂation was rising. For women, the unemployment
rate last year was the lowest since the Korean War. The authors also show
that the composition of unemployment durations has shifted toward longer
spells. Although spells of greater than twenty-six weeks have fallen by
more than half since the 1992–94 period, they are still above their levels
at previous business cycle peaks. At the same time, the short-term unem-
ployment rate (that for spells of less than five weeks) fell to near an all-
time low in 1998. Thus the average length of an ongoing spell remains
higher than at the last two cyclical peaks. Meanwhile the “work experience
unemployment rate”—the proportion of labor force participants who expe-
rienced any unemployment during the year, a measure that the authors
believe is closely related to the prevalence of short spells of unemploy-
ment—has reached its lowest level since the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) started the series in 1958. To the authors, all this evidence suggests
that the key to understanding why unemployment is lower now than at
the peak of previous business cycles lies in discovering those factors that
have caused the decline in short-term joblessness.
The present expansion has been as notable for its low inﬂation rates as
for its low unemployment, and even more notable for the combination of
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reached its lowest level in decades. Katz and Krueger turn to conventional
accelerationist Phillips curve equations to examine whether these devel-
opments signal a change in the economy’s historical behavior and to find
clues about the nature of any such change. For both aggregate wage and
price Phillips curves fit to years starting in the early or mid-1970s, they
ﬁnd clear evidence of a downward shift in inﬂation at a given rate of unem-
ployment in the last decade: a dummy variable for the years after 1988 is
significant in all their regressions. Their analyses indicate that the down-
ward shift is of at least 1.5 percentage points in price equations and about
1.0 percentage point in wage equations. Their regressions in which the
shift is interacted with unemployment also show that the response of inﬂa-
tion to unemployment has declined during the past decade. However, when
the estimation period is extended to begin in 1962, a decade before the ﬁrst
oil supply shock and the slowdown in productivity growth, the evidence
for a shift in Phillips curves after 1988 is much weaker. This suggests that
the recent period may have more in common with the years before the
1970s than with the intervening period. Robert Gordon and others have
attributed roughly 0.2 percentage point of the decline in estimated
NAIRUs to measurement changes in the consumer price index. However,
Katz and Krueger observe that recent changes in statistical methods used
by the BLS cut both ways in interpreting developments in this period.
They cite studies showing that measurement changes in the Current Pop-
ulation Survey have raised the aggregate unemployment rate by an amount
similar to the decline Gordon calculated.
Trends in compensation of different groups in the labor market have
diverged substantially since the 1970s. Workers in the lowest decile of
the wage distribution fared the worst during the 1980s: their real wages fell
by 16 percent, in a decade when the real minimum wage fell by 31 percent.
Real wages at the 90th percentile rose 4 percent during the 1980s and have
risen a further 5 percent thus far in the 1990s. Grouping workers by edu-
cational attainment gives similar results, with average wages growing
fastest for workers with a college education. In the last couple of years,
however, as unemployment has continued to fall and the minimum wage
has been increased, this divergence has narrowed. Real wages have risen
across the wage distribution, and lower-wage workers have received pro-
portionally the largest real wage gains. Using disaggregated Phillips
curves, the authors ﬁnd that lower-wage workers beneﬁt disproportionately
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responsive to overall unemployment. In addition, they benefit because
their own unemployment falls more than does aggregate unemployment. 
For further insights into the recent good performance of the economy,
Katz and Krueger turn to the relation between job vacancies and unem-
ployment known as the Beveridge curve. A Beveridge curve traces out
the locus of unemployment and vacancy rates that would be experienced
with given structural and behavioral characteristics in the labor market as
the overall level of economic activity varies. Wage pressures are presumed
to vary with movements along this curve. Labor market changes that cause
an inward shift in the Beveridge curve, so that a given unemployment rate
is accompanied by a lower vacancy rate, would indicate that labor mar-
kets are less tight at any unemployment rate than they were before the
shift. Favorable inward shifts would be associated with improved effi-
ciency in matching jobs and workers, increased search effort by the unem-
ployed, demographic shifts that reduce the share of young workers (who
experience relatively high job turnover), and possibly reductions in the
pace of job reallocation. The authors note that structural or behavior
changes in the response of wages and prices to the tightness of labor mar-
kets—wage restraint driven by dwindling union membership, increased
worker insecurity, or increased international competition—would not be
expected to shift the Beveridge curve.
To investigate how the Beveridge curve has shifted over the years, Katz
and Krueger proxy vacancy rates by the Conference Board’s help wanted
index as adjusted by Katharine Abraham for trends in help wanted ads
relative to directly measured vacancies. A scatter diagram of vacancy-
unemployment points based on these data suggests a marked outward shift
in the Beveridge curve in the 1970s and an even larger inward shift since
the mid-1980s. The authors note that the recent shift is consistent with
the declining relative importance in the work force of high-turnover young
workers, with less intense job reallocation, and with more efficient job
matching through the growth of the temporary help industry. They observe
that the advent and growing importance of Internet job listings are likely to
improve matching, but also likely to lower the help wanted index relative
to true vacancies.
The authors explore the importance of changing demographics more
fully by examining their effect on actual unemployment rates. The impor-
tance of changing demographics stems mainly from the large differences
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age composition of the work force as the baby-boomers have passed
through it. The proportion of young workers in the work force—teenagers
aged 16–19 and young adults aged 20–24—rose from 16.6 percent in 1960
to 24.5 percent in 1978 and then fell back to 15.8 percent in 1997. Over the
entire period since 1960, the average unemployment rate was 17 percent
for teenagers, 10 percent for young adults, and 4 percent for workers aged
35–54. The authors note that the much higher unemployment rates of
young workers reﬂect greater employment instability, not longer spells of
unemployment, so that the aging of the work force helps explain the rela-
tive decline in short spells of unemployment in the present expansion. 
Katz and Krueger show the effect of changing demographics on unem-
ployment by calculating what the unemployment rate would have been if
the age composition of the work force had not changed over the last sev-
eral decades. By this calculation, demographic changes reduced unem-
ployment by 0.6 to 0.7 percentage point between 1979 and raised it a sim-
ilar amount between 1960 and 1979. However, between 1989 and the
present, demographic changes account for only 0.2 percentage point of the
0.8-percentage-point change actually experienced. While acknowledging
that there is considerable disagreement over the magnitude of the decline
in the NAIRU, the authors note that these results suggest that demograph-
ics may account for about a third of its decline during this decade. The
authors also note that Robert Shimer finds larger demographic effects than
their own, and larger impacts on the NAIRU, using a model that assumes
that unemployment of young workers rises when their relative numbers
rise, as it actually did, but that prime-age workers’unemployment is unaf-
fected. Katz and Krueger do not adjust unemployment for the changing
educational attainment of the work force, arguing that the primary
expected effect of increased education is on productivity.
Katz and Krueger identify the rising proportion of working-age men
who are incarcerated as an additional demographic change that has had a
noticeable effect on unemployment. The proportion of the adult population
that is in prison or jail rose from 2 in 1,000 in 1970 to 9 in 1,000 in 1998.
Roughly 90 percent of the incarcerated are men, and their numbers are
equivalent to 2.3 percent of the male work force. Because incarcerated
individuals are not counted in the work force, and because a large frac-
tion were unemployed before their arrest, their growing number has a
small but noticeable downward effect on the unemployment rate. The
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cerated population has reduced the total unemployment rate by between
0.1 and 0.3 percentage point, depending on which potential participation
rate one assumes for these individuals. The effect on unemployment rates
for subgroups of less educated and minority men is substantially larger.
And the authors warn that their calculation of effects on unemployment
does not address the possible lasting negative effects of incarceration on
the labor market prospects of these persons. 
The authors’analysis of other developments in the labor market leaves
them skeptical about how much government reemployment services have
contributed to the improvement in labor markets. The Worker Profile and
Reemployment Services (WPRS) program, which provides employment
assistance to unemployed workers identified as likely to have difficulty
finding a job, was phased in by all states in the mid-1990s. Although ear-
lier studies of job assistance programs found them cost-effective to the
government, Katz and Krueger’s analysis suggests that these studies may
have been biased, because they traced the effects over years when the
economy was expanding. Their own analysis, which uses state-level data
for 1994–98 and controls for year and state effects, concludes that the
aggregate effects of the program on employment are small.
Katz and Krueger find that substantially larger effects on unemploy-
ment are likely from the growth of temporary help services, whose share
of total employment, although still small, has doubled from 1.1 percent to
2.2 percent since 1989. Temporary help accounts for 8.2 percent of
employment growth in the current expansion. The authors cite recent
analysis by David Autor indicating that temporary help agencies play an
important role in screening and training employees. From this and other
evidence, they infer that such agencies may have reached a discernible
level of importance to the overall labor market, helping to lower hiring
costs, reduce labor market bottlenecks, improve employment matching,
and put downward pressure on wage setting. They support this judgment
with “a preliminary and highly speculative” analysis of cross-state expe-
rience. Using data on the proportion of temporary help in total employ-
ment by state, and controlling for state and year ﬁxed effects, they ﬁnd sig-
nificant evidence that a greater presence of temporary help agencies in a
state held down the growth of composition-adjusted wages there. They
also note that the growing importance of temporary help has coincided
with the inward shift of the Beveridge curve discussed earlier. 
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worker insecurity has contributed to wage stability and permitted lower
unemployment. Declining union strength is often invoked in support of
this view, because unions brought security and bargaining power to work-
ers, both in unionized firms and elsewhere through the threat of union-
ization. The authors report on the sharp decline in the importance of
unions in the workplace, where only 10 percent of private sector workers
are now unionized, and on the recent record lows in strike activities, and
they judge that these developments could be one factor in current wage
moderation. When they try to evaluate the worker insecurity hypothesis
directly, however, they find little evidence for it today. There has been a
slight decline in job tenure and a slight increase in displacement rates in
this decade. However, workers’self-reported job insecurity, which rose
slightly in the mid-1990s, is now back at past levels for business cycle
peaks. And surveys of financial security show families at their most
secure since 1965. 
Looking ahead, the authors are optimistic that the main factors that have
reduced unemployment and contributed to price stability will persist well
into the next decade. But they believe further progress in reducing unem-
ployment will require new approaches to improving the employment
prospects of less skilled and disadvantaged workers, many of whom cur-
rently suffer long spells of unemployment even in today’s buoyant labor
market. Katz and Krueger also warn that the current good performance of
the economy may in part be due to favorable shocks, such as the strong
dollar and weak oil prices, that will not persist and may even be reversed
in coming years. 
IN APRIL 1997, almost on the eve of the Asian currency crises, the
Interim Committee of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) proposed
amending the Fund’s Articles of Agreement to make currency convert-
ibility for capital transactions a fundamental objective. In the wake of the
crisis, many analysts assigned at least part of the blame to excessive capi-
tal liberalization, and some countries responded to the crisis by reimpos-
ing controls on international capital movements or tightening existing
ones. Policymakers and economists worldwide are analyzing the events
of the past few years for the lessons they provide for individual countries
and for the international ﬁnancial system. In the second paper of this issue,
Richard Cooper provides an informed history of global experience with
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backs of alternative regimes for today’s economies.
Cooper stresses the many forms and degrees of intensity that restric-
tions on capital movements can take. Capital account convertibility means
that residents and nonresidents of a country can exchange its currency for
foreign currency when buying or selling assets. But convertibility does not
rule out a range of capital restrictions, such as multiple exchange rates or
other actions designed to influence capital transactions through price
penalties or other means. Capital controls can refer just to those mea-
sures that directly restrict the quantity of foreign exchange made avail-
able for capital transactions, although in common usage it often describes
any restriction with a substantial effect. 
What we would today call capital controls have undoubtedly existed for
a very long time. Cooper provides a rich and detailed history of controls in
their modern form. He traces their origins to World War I and, in peace-
time, to the financial crisis of 1931, when first Nazi Germany and then
other nations in Europe and Latin America adopted exchange controls in
order to husband declining reserves and avoid depreciation of their cur-
rencies. From that beginning, capital controls soon became the rule rather
than the exception and remained so for a very long time. They became
firmly entrenched when they were maintained by most nations during
World War II and through the subsequent recovery. During the postwar
reconstruction, liberalization of the global economic system proceeded
along the lines laid out at Bretton Woods in 1944 and implemented
through the newly created IMF and World Bank. Reforms concentrated
on trade and current accounts, so that well into the 1960s the only
advanced industrial nations operating without capital controls were
Canada, Switzerland, and the United States. Germany gave up controls late
in that decade, Britain did so a decade later, and France and Italy only
completely freed capital movements a decade after that. Although nations
in most other regions have dropped or lessened capital restrictions over the
postwar period just as the nations of Europe did, Latin America has gone
from being the most open region to capital flows in 1960 to the most
closed today. 
In response to the general freeing of economies from capital restric-
tions, the volume of capital movements across borders has grown dramat-
ically. Cooper reports that, between the early 1970s and the early 1990s,
annual net ﬂows of foreign direct investment increased tenfold into indus-
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ment grew even more rapidly. During the same period the value of world
merchandise exports rose by only a factor of seven. As the recent crises
have reminded us, this great expansion of capital ﬂows that has accompa-
nied the lifting of restrictions can both provide beneﬁts and increase costs
and risks. And the current debate about the causes of the crisis and where
to go from here requires an understanding of both. 
Most economists presume that freedom of capital movements is highly
desirable for promoting the efﬁcient international allocation of resources.
They therefore tend to disfavor any form of restrictions on those flows.
Cooper does not accept this easy verdict, but instead provides a critical dis-
cussion of the arguments for and against capital mobility given the imper-
fect development of many countries’financial sectors and the realities of
world capital markets.
Cooper provides a long list of arguments that have been advanced for
and against liberalization of capital movements. Arguments for them
include the following:A free society should permit its people to place their
assets wherever they choose. Capital movements can optimize the use of
the world’s resources. Restrictions on capital movements are bound to be
ineffective in our modern world and thus will invite corruption and dis-
respect for law if attempted. And free capital movements discipline gov-
ernments. Arguments for restricting capital flows include the following:
Under ﬁxed exchange rates, free capital movements limit the usefulness of
countercyclical monetary policy. Capital restrictions may be needed to
prevent currency flight from causing financial instability. They may be
needed to permit countries to impose the kinds of taxes they prefer. And
governments may find restrictions useful if they care about shaping the
industrial structure of their economies or if they want some control over
the value of their currency. 
Cooper rejects arguments that deny, a priori, a role for government and
accepts that governments’objectives for the economy are their legitimate
concern and that capital restrictions cannot be ruled out as a way of achiev-
ing them. He thus turns his attention to the remaining, economic argu-
ments against restrictions: Is the free movement of capital needed to opti-
mize the allocation of resources? Does the free movement of capital
discipline macroeconomic policies? And can capital restrictions be effec-
tive in today’s world? 
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movements would not improve the allocation of capital. One is when trade
is not fully open. If a developing country with abundant labor protects its
capital-intensive industries, such as steel and automobiles, additional for-
eign investment can misallocate capital and even reduce national income.
Another arises from capital taxation. If capital income is not taxed uni-
formly across countries, open capital markets can misallocate investment,
directing capital to where it pays the least tax rather than to where it will
be put to best use, and can encourage tax evasion. A third source of mis-
allocation derives from the fact that not all capital ﬂows are driven by well-
informed judgments about where the returns to capital are highest. Some
are governed by herdlike behavior on the part of investors and speculators.
The presence of such an element in capital flows distorts allocation and
can even destabilize exchange rates and ﬁnancial systems, as happened in
1997. A well-established ﬁnancial system, with prudential rules and effec-
tive oversight of financial institutions, minimizes the risks of destabiliza-
tion. However, Cooper notes paradoxically that, if they are not coordinated
internationally, the prudential rules that reduce risk for a country can also
drive capital away from it to competitors with laxer rules. 
Cooper’s discussion of these issues does not create a presumption that
the efficient allocation of capital requires controls. Indeed, he recognizes
that controls on capital movements can themselves distort allocation, and
he cites South Korea as an economy in which the inability to export capi-
tal was one factor contributing to overinvestment in low-return domestic
industries. However, he does emphasize that the case for free capital ﬂows
on allocational grounds must be established rather than assumed, and the
case will not be the same for all countries or all times. 
Whether openness to capital flows provides a useful discipline on
domestic policymakers is a question of political economy on which rele-
vant evidence is not easy to come by. Cooper observes that the architects
of the single currency for Europe adopted fiscal rules because they did
not want to rely on markets to discipline governments. He also cites work
by Woochan Kim that shows that capital openness is associated with
smaller fiscal deficits or larger surpluses. But he adds that such an effect
may not always be desirable: many circumstances call not for larger but for
smaller surpluses or even deﬁcits. 
Turning to the effectiveness of controls, Cooper provides both an analy-
sis based on exchange rate premiums and an extensive discussion of coun-
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gray market will often emerge in a currency whose markets are controlled,
and a premium in excess of transactions costs in this market indicates
that the controls are effective. Cooper finds that, in 1988, the currencies
of ninety-one countries traded in black or gray markets at premiums of
more than 5 percent over official exchange rates. He compares these pre-
miums with an index created by Dennis Quinn that attempts to scale the
degree of capital restrictions by country, both in 1973 and in 1988. He
finds some negative correlation, with greater liberality associated with
lower premiums, although the relation is driven mainly by a relatively
few observations. 
Cooper’s discussion of individual cases both illustrates the variety of
restrictions that have been employed and lends further evidence that
restrictions have been effective. As his historical discussion makes clear,
for an extended period starting in the 1930s controls were widespread even
among the advanced nations, and their effectiveness was apparent. He
therefore turns to more recent experiences for evidence on how controls
have fared in modern times. Among several countries that maintained
segregated markets for overseas portfolio investment, including Belgium,
Britain, South Africa, and Sweden, he finds significant and persistent
exchange rate premiums in most, suggesting that segregation was effective
over long periods. He reports that the “exchange equalization tax” imposed
on short-term capital flows by the United States from 1963 to 1969 is
believed to have pushed outflows toward longer maturities but to have
had no discernible effect on total flows. Effects of this slight attempt at
restriction were themselves slight. France, during the 1980s when it still
maintained capital controls, experienced periods lasting several months
during which short-term interest rates were substantially higher in the
eurofranc market than in Paris, indicating substantial effectiveness over
those intervals. Cooper also discusses the use of capital restrictions by
Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand during the latest crisis but concludes it is
too early to assess their usefulness.
Cooper discusses at some length Chile’s widely cited policy of, in
effect, taxing short-term capital flows. The policy is implemented by
requiring non-interest-bearing reserves to be held against short-term bank
liabilities to foreigners. Since the policy was introduced in 1991, Chile has
varied the level of the required reserve between 30 percent and zero, with
the dual objectives of holding down inflation and maintaining a competi-
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regulations in response to attempts at evasion and have added restrictions
to discourage quick round trips on direct and portfolio investments from
abroad. How effective the controls have been in achieving their ultimate
objectives is controversial. Cooper reports that the Chilean peso appreci-
ated by 30 percent while the restrictions were in effect and that net capi-
tal inﬂows grew through most of the decade. However, it does appear that
the restrictions lengthened the maturity of Chilean foreign liabilities,
which presumably helped protect Chile from ﬁnancial crises that emerged
elsewhere and kept short-term interest rates well above those prevailing
in world markets. 
Having established that capital restrictions can be useful under many
circumstances, Cooper concludes with a look at the choices confronting
developing countries. He argues that small, open economies are vulnerable
to speculative capital flows that can drastically change the exchange rate
and the price level, distorting trade ﬂows and destabilizing the economy. In
Cooper’s view this makes free capital movements and floating exchange
rates incompatible for all countries except those that enjoy well-developed
ﬁnancial markets. He argues further that conventional ﬁxed exchange rate
regimes are also vulnerable and so also incompatible with free capital
movements for many countries. He therefore concludes that unless a coun-
try is prepared to tie its currency irrevocably to some leading foreign cur-
rency, it may need to maintain some restrictions on capital movements. 
THE CURRENCY CRISES that erupted in several developing countries
beginning in the summer of 1997 reopened old questions about the costs
and benefits of capital flows. The crises’rapid spread from Thailand to
other developing countries exposed the vulnerability of these economies to
massive capital outflows and exchange rate instability. This potential for
instability and the costs it brings have been the subject of intense study
since the crises began. In the first of three reports in this issue, Barry
Bosworth and Susan Collins examine the other side of the ledger: what
impact capital flows have on developing economies as measured by their
effects on consumption, investment, and the current account. 
Both economists and policymakers have long viewed gaining access to
international capital markets as an important step in economic develop-
ment. Bosworth and Collins review the ways in which developing
economies stand to benefit from such access. These capital-poor
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and increase domestic investment. They may also benefit from the transfer
of managerial and technical know-how that accompanies foreign direct
investment (FDI) and from the development of domestic financial mar-
kets that foreign bank lending and portfolio investment may promote.
Some observers even argue that open capital markets discipline domestic
policymaking, through the implied threat of capital flight. So widely
accepted is the presumptive case for such benefits that, even in the after-
math of the recent crises, most proposals for reform have focused not on
reining in capital ﬂows but on reducing the risks of ﬁnancial instability so
that flows can continue unabated. Yet as the authors note, there has been
little empirical evaluation of the direct economic consequences of capital
inﬂows, and they set out to provide some. 
Bosworth and Collins use data from countries’balance of payments
accounts, gathered mainly by the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and from their national income and product accounts. They distinguish
three types of capital ﬂows—FDI, portfolio investment, and other ﬁnancial
flows (primarily bank loans)—and provide a consistent framework for
relating capital inflows to other components of the balance of payments,
including the current account, capital outflows, and reserve accumula-
tion. They assemble panel data for a near-exhaustive list of fifty-eight
developing economies for each of the years from 1978 through 1995, the
most recent year for which complete data are available. Although this
limits their analysis to the years before the crest in the surge of lending that
preceded the 1997–98 crises, the data display substantial variation over
time. Hong Kong, Panama, and Singapore are excluded because their role
as financial centers makes it impossible to measure their capital inflows
properly. They also analyze a subset of eighteen emerging market
economies with relatively advanced financial systems that accounted for
90 percent of total ﬁnancial ﬂows to developing countries during 1990–95.
One of the presumptive benefits of capital inflows to developing, capi-
tal-scarce economies is that they finance inflows of the real resources
needed to increase investment, and thereby growth, and to smooth ﬂuctu-
ations in consumption when adverse shocks occur. These resource inﬂows
would then show up in the balance of payments as a current account
deficit. The authors find, however, that capital inflows have not simply
financed larger current account deficits, as simple models might have
assumed. Historically, only about half of the cumulative inﬂows have been
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declined during the first half of the 1990s. Reserve assets have risen by
about one-third the amount of cumulative inflows, and capital outflows
have offset about another third, although these outflows have been con-
centrated around crisis periods and among a few countries that have per-
mitted residents to transfer funds freely. Other balance of payments cate-
gories such as exceptional ﬁnancing by authorities in connection with debt
crises, and errors and omissions, which are often associated with capital
flight, are large in some periods. Over time, the composition of capital
inflows has shifted toward FDI and portfolio investment and away from
loans, which was the dominant form of inflow at the start of the period.
Interestingly, there is little evidence of complementarity among the three
types of capital inflows: there is little correlation among them over time
or across countries. For example, there is no presumption that countries
that received large amounts of loans also received large amounts of FDI
or portfolio capital. 
Bosworth and Collins review the lessons of theoretical models that ana-
lyze the effects of access to international capital markets. In a standard
neoclassical model, improved access is likely to increase consumption
but has ambiguous effects on saving. Consumption smoothing is the major
beneﬁt derived from access, not increased investment or more rapid long-
term growth. But the authors note that the theoretical models miss some
essential features of developing economies: the models assume that
domestic capital markets are highly developed, equalizing borrowing and
lending rates, and they ignore the preference of foreigners to lend for
investment rather than consumption. Finding little guidance for their
empirical work from these and other theoretical models, the authors take
a less structured approach, building on existing empirical research on the
determinants of investment and saving in developing economies. They
treat capital inflows, output growth, and changes in the terms of trade as
the main determinants of domestic investment, saving, and, by subtraction,
the current account; all but the terms of trade are expressed as percent-
ages of GDP in their analyses. 
In contrast to some earlier studies, Bosworth and Collins control for
country-specific effects. Their estimates thus reflect the variations within
countries over time and avoid the bias that would arise if unobserved
country-specific effects are correlated with the variables they are analyz-
ing. The authors also recognize that capital inflows are endogenous: they
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ment demand. To avoid the potential bias from this endogeneity, the
authors use instrumental variables to isolate those ﬂows that are related to
exogenous shifts in the supply of capital. They experiment with U.S. inter-
est rates and deviations of real U.S. GDP from trend as instruments, but
in the end they prefer to use total gross inflows to all developing
economies as an instrument. They believe this global total reflects the sup-
ply of capital from the developed world and is largely independent of any
individual developing country’s economic condition. In their estimation
it dominates the other measures of supply shifts. Other instruments used
are speciﬁc to each country; these include the IMF’s indicator of the pres-
ence or absence of controls on financial flows, changes in the terms of
trade, the prior year’s capital inﬂows, and the prior year’s change in GDP.
The authors’econometric results provide several interesting insights
into the effects of capital flows on developing economies. For both the full
sample of countries and the emerging markets subsample, domestic invest-
ment rises by about half of total inflows. Domestic saving declines, but
by much less, implying that the current account moves toward deficit by
about 69 percent of inflows (53 percent for the emerging market
economies). These changes in the current account, again, measure the net
real resource transfer that accompanies the capital inﬂows. 
The authors find substantially different effects for each type of capital
flow. FDI has the strongest relationship with domestic investment of the
three types. Domestic investment rises by 90 percent of FDI in the emerg-
ing market economies and by 81 percent of FDI in the full sample. Sur-
prisingly, FDI raises domestic saving by almost as much as it raises invest-
ment, so that the effect on the current account is negligible. Portfolio
investment has only small and insignificant effects on either saving or
investment. The effect of foreign loans is intermediate: investment rises by
44 percent of loans in the emerging market economies and by 50 percent
of loans in the full sample, and domestic saving declines modestly. As a
consequence, loans move current accounts substantially toward deﬁcit. 
The authors’main ﬁndings are robust over some alternative estimations,
indicating that a large portion of capital ﬂows to a country have gone into
domestic investment rather than consumption. Within total flows, FDI
has had the most clearly beneficial effects on investment, and portfolio
capital has had none. This clearly supports the long-held view that FDI is
different. The effects on saving and on the current account are less certain
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require full capital convertibility, Bosworth and Collins see their results
as supporting an orderly sequencing of capital account liberalization in
which domestic financial markets and regulatory oversight are strength-
ened before external convertibility is complete. 
THE NATIONAL SAVING rate plays a prominent role in explanations of
long-term growth and productivity. During the 1980s and early 1990s,
economists and policymakers placed part of the blame for the lackluster
performance of U.S. productivity on the low rate of national saving, which
in turn was largely blamed on government deficits. But part of the expla-
nation of the low national saving rate was a U.S. personal saving rate that
was low by both international and U.S. historical standards. The tax
changes of 1993 and the sustained expansion of this decade have resulted in
a dramatic turnaround in government saving, lifting the national saving rate
above its 1980s levels. However, this improvement masks a continuing
decline in personal (household) saving as measured by the national income
and product accounts (NIPAs). The personal saving rate fell from 5.7 per-
cent of GDP in the 1970s to 3.5 percent in the early 1990s, and it has actu-
ally dipped below zero since the fall of 1998. Although of no special eco-
nomic signiﬁcance in itself, the crossing of aggregate personal saving into
negative territory has rekindled concern about the adequacy of households’
provision for retirement and has underlined the current, unprecedented
dependence of national saving on government. For some observers it has
raised the specter of severe recession or worse should households return to
more prudent ways. In the second report in this issue, William Gale and
John Sabelhaus take a detailed look at the household saving rate, showing
how the use of different concepts of saving alters the picture of household
behavior and enhances our understanding of the NIPA saving rate. 
The authors begin by discussing the conceptual underpinnings of NIPA
saving and various alternative measures. Saving is always defined as the
difference between “income” and “consumption,” but each of these terms
can be defined in very different ways. Historically, economists have used
two major definitions of income, Hicksian and Fisherian. For an econ-
omy as a whole, Hicksian income is defined as the amount of production
in the current period that can be consumed while leaving the capital stock
intact. The difference between Hicksian income and consumption corre-
sponds to capital accumulation and is appropriate for tracking the amount
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sectors or of households, the corresponding deﬁnition of saving is income
from current production used to purchase assets or reduce debt, thereby
increasing net worth. The Hicksian definition excludes from income and
saving any revaluations of the capital stock at the aggregate level and any
capital gains or losses at the individual or sectoral level. 
Fisherian income, on the other hand, is the amount of output that can be
consumed in the current period while allowing as much consumption in
each successive period—it is the consumption annuity provided by com-
mand over resources. Saving thus deﬁned excludes capital gains unless the
gain reflects an increase in consumption possibilities. For an economy,
revaluation of assets does not reﬂect such an increase, except in the case of
claims on foreigners. However, capital gains that reflect revisions in
expected future productivity do affect Fisherian income and, to the extent
this income is not consumed, Fisherian saving. At the household level,
capital gains that reflect revaluations of claims on others do count as
income, just as national claims on foreigners do at the aggregate level.
Fisherian income is thus the natural measure for explaining individual con-
sumption behavior. 
The authors note that which definition of saving is most appropriate
depends on the question being asked, and that measuring saving by either
definition poses problems. For example, to understand how well house-
holds are preparing for retirement, it would be logical to focus on per-
sonal wealth measures, including claims on social security and medicare
beneﬁts. In contrast, when examining government policies that encourage
saving for retirement, it would be logical to include the effects on govern-
ment saving as well as on private saving, since a policy that raised private
saving but reduced government saving by more would reduce rather than
add to capital accumulation. Another issue is how broad a definition of
consumption or of capital to use. Capital can be defined narrowly as the
physical stock of plant and equipment used in production, or it can include
tangible and intangible investments in technology and investments in
human, public, natural, and environmental capital. The dividing line
between consumption and investment is often imprecise, as in the case of
education, and the attribution of income and expenditure among house-
holds, ﬁrms, and governments is somewhat arbitrary. 
Gale and Sabelhaus turn ﬁrst to a discussion of personal, or household,
income and saving as measured in the NIPAs. Households are defined
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sion funds, life insurance, trust funds, not-for-profit organizations, and
unincorporated businesses. The NIPA measures of income, consumption,
and saving are based on the Hicksian concept. Personal saving is meant
to represent the portion of household claims on current production not
consumed by them and therefore available for capital formation. Accord-
ingly, it does not include accrued or realized capital gains (although it is
reduced by the taxes on such gains).
The authors discuss at some length several other important features of
the NIPA measure of personal saving: the treatment of pensions and social
security, the treatment of durable goods and housing, and the treatment of
nominal interest receipts and payments. As would be expected given the
conceptual framework of the NIPAs, personal saving includes all contri-
butions to, and interest and dividends on, private pensions and 401(k)
plans. Individual retirement accounts and Keogh plans are treated simi-
larly. Employer contributions to pension plans, whether they are defined
benefit or defined contribution plans, are also counted as part of labor
income and hence are part of personal saving. Consistent with this treat-
ment, payments of private pension benefits are not included as income.
However, the treatment of corporate contributions does not accurately
measure the accrual of benefits by individuals enrolled in defined benefit
plans. In particular, the time pattern of benefit accruals may be quite dif-
ferent from that of contributions by corporations and investment earn-
ings, and this can create an important difference between a household’s
view of its wealth accumulation and recorded NIPA saving. However, the
NIPAs do appropriately measure the net saving of households and corpo-
rations taken together, since the accrual of benefits by households is off-
set by the accrual of a liability to corporations until they actually make
the pension contribution. 
The NIPAs’ treatment of public pension and insurance funds runs
exactly counter to their treatment of private funds. Contributions of fed-
eral, state, and local governments to such funds are not attributed to house-
holds and are therefore not a part of personal saving. Similarly, social
security contributions are counted not in personal saving, but rather as per-
sonal tax and nontax payments. In these cases, rather than attempt to cap-
ture the accrual of claims by households, the NIPAs count benefit pay-
ments as personal income at the time they are made. 
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complicated. They question why expenditures on consumer durables are
treated as consumption even though, like owner-occupied housing, con-
sumer durables are physical assets delivering a stream of consumption ser-
vices over their lifetime. They note the inflation illusion in the NIPAs’
use of nominal rather than real interest receipts and payments in measur-
ing income and outlays. They also note that personal saving ignores the
implicit tax liabilities in pensions: a portion of payments into tax-sheltered
plans represents deferred government taxes rather than an increase in
household net worth.
Some of these same issues arise in the NIPAs’treatment of corpora-
tions. The authors observe that the measure of corporate saving, like that
of personal saving, does not adjust interest flows for inflation. The line
between personal and corporate saving is unclear and somewhat arbitrary
and creates anomalies in the allocation of income between households and
corporations like those discussed above in connection with defined bene-
ﬁts. For example, corporate dividend payments and corporate share repur-
chases both shift funds from the corporate to the household sector, but only
the former are regarded as household income. Until recently, mutual fund
distributions of capital gains were allocated to personal income; they are
now classiﬁed as corporate income. As a separate matter, the authors note
that, wherever they are allocated, these capital gains are included in private
(household and corporate) income and saving, which is inconsistent with
the underlying principle of the NIPAs that income is measured from cur-
rent production.
How different would the level, composition, and trend of saving appear
if the NIPA data were adjusted to take all these factors into account? Using
data in the flow of funds accounts (FFAs), the authors calculate how net
investment would be increased if consumer durables were counted as
investment, how each sector’s saving would be affected by adjusting nom-
inal interest rates for inflation, how private saving would be increased if
government pensions were treated like private pensions, and how contri-
butions to tax-sheltered pensions would be changed by accounting for the
accrual of implicit taxes. The adjusted data show both national invest-
ment and national saving about 2 percentage points higher than indicated
by the NIPAs, but with similar general trends. However, taken together the
adjustments significantly alter the sectoral composition of the saving
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fallen less in recent years than have the unadjusted measures. Personal sav-
ing has fallen by only 1 percent of GDP in the 1990s by the adjusted mea-
sure, but by more than 3 percent in the official statistics. Similarly, per-
sonal saving in the 1990s has fallen by only 2 percent of GDP relative to
its levels in the 1970s and 1980s, rather than by almost 5 percent in the
NIPA data. Crediting households for the beneﬁts they accumulate in gov-
ernment retirement accounts and trust funds adds over 1.5 percent of GDP
to personal saving in recent years, but adjusting for accrual of taxes leads
to an offsetting 1 percent decline. In contrast to these relatively stable
adjustments, the reallocation of saving between creditors (households
and foreigners) and debtors (government and corporations) that results
from using real rather than nominal interest rates varies substantially with
changes in inflation, and much of the recorded decline in the personal
saving rate can be attributed to the decline in inﬂation. From the 1970s to
1995 the nominal personal saving rate as measured by the NIPAs fell by
3 percent of GDP. But adjusting interest flows for inflation eliminates five-
sixths of that decline and eliminates roughly 40 percent of the decline
recorded between 1995 and 1998.
The FFA data on saving, compiled by the Federal Reserve, are intended
to represent the same concept of personal saving as the NIPA measure,
except that accumulations in government pensions and investment in con-
sumer durables are attributed to households. However, the FFAs are
assembled from different data; in particular, they use estimates of asset
values at discrete points in time and the active acquisition and disposition
of assets and liabilities in measuring saving. The discrepancy between the
NIPA and FFA measures of saving due to these statistical differences per
se is quite small, generally less than 1 percent of income. 
Gale and Sabelhaus use the FFA data to examine the composition of pri-
vate saving. They compute saving as a fraction of an appropriately
expanded measure of private disposable income, including corporate
retained earnings and net investment in government pensions. On this
basis the saving rate looks higher but shows the same general downward
movement as the NIPA measure. The authors identify several interesting
features of this decline. Acquisitions of financial assets, net of tax accruals
implicit in pension saving, fell from about 13 percent of GDP in the 1980s
to 6 percent in 1996–98, with almost all the decline occurring in saving
that does not qualify for tax deferral. The rise in private borrowing over the
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in private saving, but on average the decade looks much like previous peri-
ods. Similarly, although borrowing typically exceeded investment in
durables and housing during the 1990s, this merely follows a historical
pattern.
Some of the adjustments to private saving also affect calculations of
government saving. Not surprisingly, the adjustment for tax accruals has
a signiﬁcant impact on the time path of the federal surplus. In recent years
tax liabilities have accrued annually at a rate of about 4 percent of GDP;
accrued liabilities on pensions and individual retirement accounts alone
have risen by $2 trillion since 1980, an amount equal to about half the
outstanding federal debt. 
The spectacular runup in U.S. stock markets in recent years has height-
ened awareness of the significant difference between measures of saving
based on current production, like the NIPAs and the FFAs, and measures
of changes in net worth that include capital gains. Using information in the
FFAs, the authors ﬁnd that capital gains have dominated measured saving
as a source of wealth change during most of the past forty years. Not sur-
prisingly, capital gains since 1995 are large relative to earlier years,
accounting for over 80 percent of gains in household net worth and even
more when the decline in inflation is taken into consideration. The com-
position of gains has also changed. In earlier periods tangible capital
accounted for almost half of the gains, whereas in the 1990s financial
assets have accounted for almost all of them. Capital gains on pension
assets alone have been about 10 percent of income over the last four years.
The rate of growth in household net worth, even after accounting for inﬂa-
tion and tax accruals, has been extraordinary in the second half of the
1990s; the increases average over 25 percent of income, even when income
is expanded to include the gains themselves. On a comparable basis, the
household saving rate was 12 percent in the 1970s and 18 percent in 
the 1980s. 
Assuming this newfound financial wealth of households is not
ephemeral, it represents a signiﬁcant improvement in their command over
resources and makes it easy to rationalize the currently low level of house-
hold saving. But it is unlikely, in fact, that all this wealth could be con-
sumed by the generations that have acquired it. The authors note that a
large part of the gains in wealth reflects a reduction in the risk premium
required on stocks—a revaluation that does not expand the nation’s con-
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mistically suggested that recent capital gains reflect the market’s correct
assessment of future improvements in technology and productivity, and
hence in the nation’s consumption possibilities. But whatever the
prospects for some new firms may be, it is hard to believe this argument
explains much of the rise in the overall market.
THE BOOMING U.S. economy is today virtually the only bright spot in
a world economy beset by subpar growth or outright recession. Although
the emerging economies of the Paciﬁc Basin appear to have bottomed out
of their crisis, much of Western Europe is moving ahead only slowly, and
many Latin American economies appear vulnerable to renewed decline. In
Japan, where the general price level has actually dropped in recent years
and where producer prices fell by 5 percent during 1998, recovery is still
uncertain, and monetary policy cannot lower real interest rates signifi-
cantly with nominal rates already near zero. Some observers see excess
global manufacturing capacity, and global slack in general, leading to a
worldwide deflation that could derail even the U.S. economy. In the last
report of this issue, Bradford DeLong examines whether there is reason
to fear deflation in the United States and whether policymakers are
equipped to deal with the problems created by deﬂation should it appear. 
Public awareness of the possibility of deflation has increased dramati-
cally in the past year: DeLong reports that the number of articles about
deﬂation in major U.S. newspapers increased more than tenfold in the six
months before the Brookings conference. Yet for most of the postwar
period inflation, not deflation, has been the main concern. By the mid-
1970s many observers had concluded that the U.S. economy had an inﬂa-
tionary bias. DeLong observes that some economists had already come to
this view by the late 1930s: shortly after publication of Keynes’s General
Theory, Jacob Viner warned of such a bias in Keynesian policies aimed at
full employment. In Viner’s view, Keynesian policies were likely to result
in a “constant race between the printing press and the business agents of
the trade unions...” in order to maintain employment at its potential.
DeLong goes on to describe how Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott
developed and sharpened this idea of inﬂationary bias in the 1970s. In their
simple model, central banks concerned with unemployment are tempted to
take advantage of a short-run Phillips curve to boost employment, but in
the end they are unsuccessful, as workers and managers with rational
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result is that equilibrium production and unemployment are unaffected, but
inflation is higher than desirable. Whether because of such insights or
because of the actual experience with inﬂation following the two oil price
explosions of the 1970s, a common culture of central banking has emerged
in many countries in which control of inflation is the paramount if not sole
objective. Ironically, however, more or less simultaneously with this
heightening of concern about inﬂationary bias in monetary policy, inﬂation
was actually vanishing. DeLong raises the possibility that the apparent bias
toward inflation in the 1960s and 1970s resulted not from any game-
theoretic interaction between central bankers and the economy but rather
from “painful misjudgments about the structure of the economy that were
corrected after the 1970s.”
The only living Americans who have actually experienced a signiﬁcant
deflation are those old enough to remember the Great Depression. The
decline in prices during that period was indeed dramatic. From 1929 to
1933 the consumer price index fell 25 percent, and prices received by
farmers fell by more than half. Neither consumer nor agricultural producer
prices regained their 1929 levels until 1943. DeLong briefly reviews how
economists’views of inﬂation and deﬂation changed during this period as
well as the lessons about deflation they have drawn from that experience.
He reports that most economists in the 1920s treated inﬂation and deﬂation
as roughly symmetric “evils to be shunned.” But he sees the Depression
as shifting the balance of fears to deflation, with “a near consensus …
that deflation was deeply dangerous and to be avoided at all costs.”
Although economists have differed about the root causes of the Depres-
sion, according to DeLong almost every analyst during and since the 1930s
has “placed general deflation—and the chain of financial and real bank-
ruptcies that it caused—at or near the heart of the worst macroeconomic
disaster the world has ever seen.” Before and during the Depression, Irving
Fisher stressed the damage to leveraged companies and financial institu-
tions from the increase in real indebtedness that deﬂation caused and from
the fact that nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero. DeLong cites a
number of economists who later emphasized the inﬂexibility produced by
the zero ﬂoor and how deﬂation’s disruption of ﬁnancial markets had dis-
astrous effects for production and employment. Milton Friedman and
Anna Schwartz, for example, stressed the harm to banks’balance sheets
from debtors’diminished ability to service loans and described how the
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ratios of reserves and currency to deposits. Peter Temin emphasized the
deflation-driven deterioration in corporate balance sheets. Barry Eichen-
green and Charles Kindleberger focused on the international transmission
of deﬂation and its interaction with exchange rates.
All of these mechanisms share a crucial element, namely, the fact that
ﬁnancial contracts are written in nominal currency units. DeLong observes
that economists lack satisfactory theories of why borrowers and lenders
choose to contract in such an unstable unit of account as nominal dollars,
without conditioning on macroeconomic events like deflation. Contract
theory does rationalize debt contracts as a way to reduce principal-agent
problems and to economize on lenders’monitoring and supervision of
entrepreneurs. Failure of a ﬁrm to make interest and principal payments on
time signals that the owners and managers are not performing well and that
a change in management and ownership may be warranted. But debt con-
tracts are specified in nominal terms, and because deflation has the same
consequences for firms’debt-servicing ability as does poor managerial
performance, it can trigger the same steps toward restructuring or liqui-
dation by lenders. The fact that the defaults induced by deflation are sys-
temwide, and that each firm’s real condition is adversely affected by the
default of others, ampliﬁes the problem.
It seems evident that deﬂation played a major role in the Great Depres-
sion. But since that time the U.S. economy has changed dramatically. For
one thing, farm incomes and prices are much less important to the broader
economy today. For another, even with the decline in manufacturing
employment and unions, labor markets appear much less likely to translate
unemployment into absolute reductions in wage rates. And the govern-
ment, with its rigid wages and salaries, its many fixed obligations (both
nominal and real), and its immunity from financial bankruptcy, is a far
larger player in the economy. But precisely because we have had no sig-
nificant deflationary experience recently, DeLong points out, we have no
reliable evidence on whether today’s economy might succumb to a defla-
tionary shock, turning it into a financial crisis and a severe economic
downturn. He also notes that economies have more to fear than a decline in
broad goods and services price indices alone—a sharp fall in asset prices
could produce much the same result. For example, if securities and real
estate holdings have been pledged as collateral for debt, a retreat in their
price levels will have effects similar to that of falling prices for goods.
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a large-scale decline in real estate prices, but that the risk of a major stock
market decline is more substantial. Moreover, he sees a deﬂation in broad
goods and services prices as perhaps less unlikely than we hope. 
His assessment of the risks leads DeLong to inquire whether the Federal
Reserve could offset a significant deflationary shock. He reports empirical
studies that show that the Fed has very limited ability to affect the price
level over a one- or two-year horizon. Monetary policy has more rapid
effects on output, but the zero ﬂoor on nominal interest rates could signif-
icantly limit its effectiveness in a deﬂation. If the Fed could reliably fore-
cast the price level sufficiently far in advance, these lags in policy would
not be a problem. But, DeLong argues, it cannot. He reports that the stan-
dard deviation of the price level two and a half years ahead is 6.6 percent,
and that a simple statistical model that conditions future inflation on past
inﬂation, unemployment, and nominal interest rates, and even on the iden-
tity of the chairman of the Federal Reserve, reduces that error only to
slightly less than 4 percent. Hence, starting from today’s already low inﬂa-
tion rate, DeLong sees a real chance, albeit a small one, of a shock that
would put us well into deﬂationary territory.
On the other hand, DeLong enumerates several reasons for believing
that a debt-deflation spiral set in motion by an unanticipated commodity
price decline is not a serious threat. First, it may well take a bigger shock
to induce a given level of deflation than to induce the same amount of
inflation, and if so, estimates drawn from the postwar period probably
overstate the risks. Second, a large part of the variance in postwar infla-
tionary experience comes from the turbulent 1970s. The years between
1971 and 1983, although representing only about a quarter of the postwar
period, account for 90 percent of the postwar variance in consumer prices,
and the standard deviation of inflation since then is only one-third of that
for the entire period. DeLong believes that the 1970s may well have been
a unique episode and that the inflationary shocks experienced in that
decade could almost never happen in reverse. He also believes that skill
in conducting monetary policy in the United States has increased over the
decades. However, nothing can be ruled out entirely, and he believes the
experience in Japan and Europe in recent years sends a warning to policy-
makers to remain alert.
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